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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of financial hedging on firm performance in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a sample of 1, 369 acquisitions announced by S&P
1500 firms between 2000 and 2014, we find strong evidence that derivatives users experience
higher announcement returns than nonusers, which translates into a $193.7 million shareholder
gain for an average-sized acquirer. In addition, we find that acquirers with hedging programs
have higher deal completion probabilities, longer deal completion time, and better long-term
post-deal performance. We confirm our findings after employing an extensive array of models to
address the potential endogeneity. Overall, our results provide new insights into a link between
corporate financial hedging and firm performance.
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1 Introduction
Financial derivatives have been widely used as risk management instruments by companies
around the world.1 Despite the popularity of using financial derivatives among corporations and
the theoretical groundwork in support of corporate financial hedging (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982;
Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Leland, 1998; Froot et al., 1993; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995),
empirical findings on the relation between corporate financial hedging and firm value are still mixed.
For example, Allayannis et al. (2001) find that the use of foreign currency derivatives is positively
correlated with firm value in a large sample of U.S. nonfinancial corporations with foreign currency
risk exposures. Carter et al. (2006) report a significantly positive hedging premium among a sample
of U.S. airline firms that engage in jet fuel hedging. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) show that
the cash flows generated by hedging are modest and cannot account for a large increase in firm
value. Jin and Jorion (2006) study a sample of oil and gas producers and find no significant impact
of financial hedging on firm value.
In addition to the mixed findings on the relation between hedging and firm value, empirical
studies that examine the effect of hedging on firm operating activities have been surprisingly lacking.
In this paper, we fill this gap by studying an important form of firm operation that is well known for
changing a company’s financial risk exposure – cross-border mergers and acquisitions. By examining
the impact of hedging on deal performance, we seek to contribute to the literature on whether, and
how, risk management affects firm performance. Cross-border M&A activities have been on the
rise around the world over the last two decades as a result of deregulation and the globalization of
product and capital markets.2 Compared to domestic M&As, cross-border M&As involve additional
1A 1998 Wharton survey of financial risk management by U.S. non-financial firms (Bodnar et al., 1998) finds that
41.5% of respondents use foreign currency derivatives and 38% firms use interest rate derivatives. An International
Swaps Derivatives Association (ISDA) survey in 2009 shows that 94% of the world’s 500 largest companies use
derivatives to manage their business and financial risks, of which 88% use derivatives to manage foreign currency
risk. According to the statistics released by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the notional value of
outstanding interest rate and foreign currency derivatives held by global non-financial customers was $15.7 trillion
and $9.1 trillion, respectively, at the end of June 2014.
2Thomson Reuters reports that global cross-border M&As reached a peak level of $1.8 trillion in 2007, accounting
for 44.8% of overall M&A volume. After the global financial crisis, the value of global cross-border M&As hit bottom
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risk elements due to differences in culture, geography, capital market development, accounting rules,
and regulations between the acquirer and the target countries. More importantly, taking over a
foreign target significantly changes the acquirer’s financial risk exposures. As shown in Figure 1,
the timeline of M&A transactions can be divided into three stages: pre-acquisition period (between
the start of private negotiation and the deal announcement), interim period (between the deal
announcement and completion), and post-acquisition period (after deal completion).3 An acquirer
in a cross-border M&A encounters deal related risk exposures at different stages. During the pre-
acquisition stage, both the acquirer and the target encounter valuation fluctuation due to exchange
rate movements, which may change the target’s attractiveness to the acquirer. During the interim
stage, an acquirer is exposed to new foreign exchange (FX) risk if the payment is denominated in
the target nation’s currency. In addition, if an acquisition requires external financing, the acquirer
is exposed to interest rate (IR) risk, which affects the deal financing costs. During the post-
acquisition stage, an acquirer faces greater FX exposures as a result of acquiring the foreign target
and increased foreign operation.
There are four main advantages in studying the impact of hedging on firm performance
through cross-border M&As. First, this sample naturally excludes firms without FX exposure. A
firm that does not have significant financial risk exposure may choose not to hedge due to the lack of
hedging benefits. If a sample includes firms of this nature, then the empirical tests to examine the
impact of hedging on firm performance may be compromised because these firms do not serve as an
effective control group. By focusing on firms experiencing significant increase in their risk exposures,
we are able to conduct more effective tests to identify the potential hedging benefits. Second, this
sample allows us to adopt the standard M&A event study approach, which mitigates the reverse
causality concern that firms with better performance are more likely to hedge rather than hedging
leading to improved deal outcomes. By examining acquirers’ established derivatives contracts before
in 2009 and then gradually recovered to $1.3 trillion in 2014, accounting for 36.9% of overall M&A volume.
3We follow Ahern and Sosyura (2014) to define these three time periods.
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their deal announcements when firm performance is measured, this approach alleviates the reverse
causality concern because it is unlikely that the M&A announcement returns are responsible for the
establishment of hedging programs in acquiring firms. Third, the event study approach allows us
to examine the impact of hedging on firm performance measured by stock market reaction and firm
operating performance, which offer an alternative to the firm value measure, Tobin’s Q, adopted
by most risk management studies. Acquirer announcement returns directly measure the acquirer
shareholder wealth effect associated with hedging. Finally, being the first to directly study the
effect of financial risk management on a specific type of firm operation, our results can shed some
light on the channels through which financial hedging improves firm value.
Our sample includes 1,369 cross-border M&A deals announced by S&P 1500 firms between
2000 and 2014.4 The S&P 1500 index covers 90% of the U.S. stock market capitalization and
includes firms of various sizes (S&P 500 Large Cap, S&P 400 Mid Cap, and S&P 600 Small Cap)
and industries. For each deal, we hand collect the acquirer’s derivatives data reported in its 10-K
report prior to the corresponding deal announcement date, following the derivatives data collection
procedure in Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Bartram et al. (2011).5
Our sample firms make foreign acquisitions in over 35 countries. More than 72% of these
acquirers use either foreign currency derivatives (FCD) or interest rate derivatives (IRD) to manage
firm financial risks. About 63% of acquirers use FCD and more than 37% of acquirers have FCD
positions in the currencies of target nations. Our univariate tests show that derivatives users are
better than nonusers along the dimensions of both short-term and long-term performance. We also
find that derivatives users and nonusers differ significantly in terms of size, leverage, cash ratio,
4Empirical research on corporate financial hedging after 2000 is scant due to the change in accounting rules on
derivatives information disclosure in firms’ annual financial reports. Please refer to the internet Appendix A for a
further discussion on the changes in these accounting rules.
5In the internet Appendix B, we present a few excerpts from acquirers’ 10-K reports. These statements provide
direct evidence that acquirers use derivatives to actively manage the financial risks associated with their cross-border
M&As. Under current financial accounting reporting standards, it is not mandatory for U.S. public firms to disclose
their hedging position details. Therefore our hedging proxy variables can only represent firm level financial hedging,
not deal specific hedging. There is a portion of firms in our sample that disclose M&A deal-specific hedging activities
in their 10-K reports.
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stock return momentum and volatility, as well as return on assets (ROA). In addition, the use of
derivatives is more prevalent in acquirers that take over large targets and use less equity as the
method of payment. These differences emphasize the importance of multivariate tests.
Our multivariate tests confirm that financial hedging is positively associated with acquirer
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the announcement period. Hedging with currency
derivatives is associated with an average 1.0% improvement in acquirer CARs which is equivalent
to an increase of $193.7 million in shareholder value for an average-sized acquirer. We also find
that financial hedging has an effect on other aspects of deal outcomes. First, deals made by firms
with financial hedging programs have a higher completion probability than deals by firms without
such programs. Next, we show that it takes FX derivatives users an average of 32 days longer to
complete a deal than nonusers. Our observation is consistent with the interpretation that waiting
costs for derivatives users are lower than for nonusers during the deal negotiation phase.6 We
also investigate whether the short-run superior performance of derivatives users extends into the
long-run. In terms of operating performance, we find that the change in abnormal return on assets
(AROA) for FCD users is on average 0.7% higher than nonusers over a three-year time period
after M&A deals. The improved long-term performance related to hedging is also confirmed by
measures of stock returns. Over a three-year horizon, FCD users experience 0.4% higher buy-and-
hold abnormal stock returns (BHAR) than nonusers. Overall, we find strong evidence that financial
hedging is related to improved deal performance for acquirers engaged in cross-border M&As.
A major concern for the interpretation of our empirical results is that the decision to estab-
lish a financial hedging program is not made randomly. It may depend on omitted firm charac-
teristics variables which could independently affect M&A outcomes. To address this concern, we
employ three different methods. First, we adopt a special form of Heckman selection model (Heck-
man, 1978): an endogenous treatment effect model with two-step consistent estimates (Wooldridge,
6Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015) suggest that a deal’s completion time is determined by the trade-off between the
costs and benefits of waiting.
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2010). This approach helps us estimate the “treatment effect” – that the superior deal performance
of derivatives users over nonusers is caused by hedging instead of other unobserved variables. We
adopt two instrument variables from Geczy et al. (1997), who find that the number of analysts
following a firm and the foreign sales over total sales ratio can explain why firms use foreign cur-
rency derivatives. Second, we follow Gormley and Matsa (2014) and estimate a triple interaction
fixed effects model, i.e., Year × Acquirer Industry × Target Industry, to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. Finally, we conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis. For each acqui-
sition announced by a derivatives user in our sample, we pair it with a group of similar deals
announced by nonusers using observed deal and firm characteristics. Then we compare the deal
performance between these two samples. Our findings on the relation between financial hedging
and deal performance remain robust in these three tests.
To further check on the alternative explanations for our empirical results, we conduct a bat-
tery of robustness tests. First, since acquiring firms with high quality management teams, extensive
foreign operating exposure, and rich acquisition experience are more likely to use financial deriva-
tives and have better announcement returns, we verify that the positive effect of financial hedging
on acquirer announcement returns remains robust after including all these additional control vari-
ables. Second, we add commodity derivatives (CD) as a control variable in our tests, because
CD are related to firm characteristics that determine a firm’s risk management policy but are not
directly related to the financial risks associated with cross-border M&A deals. We find that FCD
and IRD variables remain significantly positively related to acquirer announcement returns but CD
variable is not. This finding is inconsistent with the notion that derivatives hedging only signals
unobserved acquirer characteristics. Finally, by dividing our sample periods into a high exchange
rate volatility regime and a low volatility regime, we show that the positive effect of FX hedging on
acquirer announcement returns is more significant when exchange rate volatility is high, suggesting
that derivatives are more beneficial to acquirers under volatile market condition. Related to this,
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we confirm that the implied volatilities of at-the-money (ATM) options written on acquirer stocks
at the deal announcement are lower for derivatives users than nonusers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on risk management
and cross-border M&As. Section 3 develops the main test hypotheses and predictions. Section
4 describes the sample, variable definitions, and summary statistics. Section 5 reports our main
empirical results while section 6 presents robustness checks and additional discussions. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Financial hedging and firm value
Within the classic framework of Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management has no im-
pact on firm value and hedging is irrelevant if investors can engage in “home-made” hedging. How-
ever, corporate risk management becomes valuable due to the existence of market imperfections in
practice. Several motivations of corporate financial hedging have been developed in previous liter-
ature, including reduction in financial distress costs (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1984; Smith
and Stulz, 1985), alleviation of information asymmetry (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995), mitigation
of agency costs associated with underinvestment and risk-shifting (Stulz, 1984; Froot et al., 1993;
Leland, 1998), reduction in cost of debt (Chen and King, 2014), reduction in cost of equity (Gay
et al., 2011), and alleviation of effective tax payments (Graham and Rogers, 2002). Survey results
also suggest that academics commonly support the view that corporate financial hedging in general
helps firms manage risks efficiently and increases shareholder value.7
7In March 2004, ISDA conducted a survey of finance professors at the top 50 business schools worldwide to solicit
their opinions on corporate financial hedging, as well as on the impact of derivatives on the global financial system.
A total of 84 professors from 42 institutions provided responses. When asked to rate the statement “Managing
financial risk more effectively is a way for companies to build shareholder value,” 44% strongly agreed, 47% agreed,
7% somewhat agreed, and only 2% somewhat disagreed. When asked whether “Derivatives help companies manage
financial risk more efficiently,” 49% strongly agreed, 43% agreed, 8% somewhat agreed, and no participant disagreed
with the statement.
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Despite the theoretical groudwork, empirical evidence on the relation between financial hedg-
ing and firm value remains mixed. Geczy et al. (1997) examine a sample of U.S. non-financial
firms and find that hedging reduces firms’ cash flow fluctuations. Allayannis et al. (2001) identify
a hedging premium of about 5% of firm value for a sample of U.S. non-financial firms. Carter et al.
(2006) report a higher hedging premium of 10% based on a sample of firms in the airline industry.
Using international data, Bartram et al. (2011) find strong evidence that hedging firms have sig-
nificantly lower cash flow volatilities, total risk, and systematic risk. On the other hand, Tufano
(1996) studies the hedging policy of a sample of gold mining companies but fails to find a signif-
icant relation between risk management and firm value. Guay and Kothari (2003) conclude that
corporate derivatives positions in general are far too small to account for the valuation premium
observed by Allayannis et al. (2001). Jin and Jorion (2006) conclude that financial hedging has no
significant effect on the market value of a sample of U.S. oil and gas producers. Similarly, Brown
et al. (2006) confirm that selective hedging does not lead to better operating or stock performance
among a sample of U.S. gold mining firms. One potential explanation for these mixed empirical
findings is the self-selection bias. The FX exposures of U.S. corporations are determined by their
foreign operations (Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001) and companies with variable risk exposures receive
different hedging benefits in terms of value improvement (Pritamani et al., 2004).
A recent strand of literature studies the potential channels through which firms benefit from
financial hedging. Campello et al. (2011) find that derivatives users receive more favorable financing
terms in their loan agreements than nonusers. Graham and Rogers (2002) report that hedging helps
increase debt capacity, leading to an average 1.1% increase in firm value. Relatedly, Chen and King
(2014) confirm that the bond yield spread for derivatives users is lower than for nonusers. Gay et al.
(2011) report that firms using derivatives have a lower cost of equity than nonusers. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez
and Yun (2013) use the innovation of weather derivatives as a natural experiment and find that the
introduction of such derivatives leads to higher leverage, more investment, and ultimately higher
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firm value for a sample of electric and gas utility firms with weather risk exposures.
2.2 Financial hedging and M&As
M&As not only have a huge impact on an acquirer’s future operation and growth, but also
significantly change its risk profile. For example, Furfine and Rosen (2011) find that M&As increase
the average default risk of the acquiring firms. Duchin and Schmidt (2013) report that acquisitions
completed during U.S. merger waves have higher uncertainty and information asymmetry than
those occurring out of merger waves, leading to poorer deal outcomes. Bhagwat et al. (2016)
suggest that M&A activities decrease when stock market volatility increases, because the higher
interim period risk makes deals less attractive to both potential acquirers and targets. Bhagwat
and Dam (2014) provide evidence that acquirers bear more interim period risk than targets.
Cross-border M&As have received increased attention in recent studies because acquirers in
these deals experience significant FX risk change. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) confirm that
cross-border M&As increase acquirers’ foreign currency exposures. They also report that cross-
border acquirers have poorer stock and operating performance than acquirers in domestic deals.
To study how firms respond to exchange rate shocks in making investment decisions, Lin et al.
(2014) examine around 1,000 cross-border M&As and find that acquirers in countries experiencing
large currency appreciation have higher abnormal announcement returns. They further conclude
that this wealth effect is more significant for acquirers with strong corporate governance. Bartram
et al. (2013) examine a sample of U.S. firms acquiring foreign targets and conclude that these
acquisitions reduce the acquirers’ currency risk exposures if they have prior presence in the target’s
countries. Lin et al. (2009) conclude that because financial derivatives users suffer less information
asymmetry than nonusers, they tend to have better long-run stock performance than nonusers after
cross-border M&As.
Despite the wide range of studies on market uncertainties and M&As, empirical research is
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still scarce on whether acquirers use financial derivatives to manage their deal related risk and, if
they do, how successful they are in this effort. Our paper is among the first to shed light in this
area.
3 Hypotheses and empirical predictions
In this paper, we examine different deal outcomes between financial derivatives users and
nonusers in cross-border M&As. Employing the standard M&A event study approach, we develop
and test four hypotheses.
• Hypothesis (H1): Acquirer CARs around cross-border M&A announcements are higher for
financial derivatives users than nonusers.
Financial hedging is beneficial for an acquirer over the timeline of a cross-border M&A trans-
action. During the pre-acquisition period, an acquirer with existing risk management programs has
better ability and lower costs in evaluating the financial risks associated with the potential deal.
At the deal announcement, financial hedging sends investors a positive signal of an acquirer’s fi-
nancial risk management expertise and mitigates the information asymmetry problem between firm
manager and outside investors (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). During the interim period, regardless
of the payment method, financial hedging reduces the acquirer FX risk exposures associated with
deal payments. If an acquirer needs external financing, then IR derivatives help it manage the
IR risk exposure. Financial hedging is also directly associated with lower external financial costs
(e.g., Campello et al., 2011; Chen and King, 2014). After the deal completion, an acquirer with
hedging experience can design more effective risk management strategies for the combined entity
in the integration process. During the post-acquisition period, an acquirer’s balance-sheet FX risk
will increase, because the acquired assets and liabilities are denominated in foreign currencies. The
FX risk exposures of an acquirer’s future operating cash flows will also increase after acquiring the
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foreign target. An acquirer who uses derivatives can manage both balance-sheet and operating cash
flow FX risks more efficiently than an acquire who doesn’t, leading to superior market reaction at
the deal announcement.
The benefits of financial hedging associated with acquirer announcement returns can be
categorized in the following way. First, financial hedging can effectively reduce both total and
systematic risk of a company (Bartram et al., 2011). Acquiring a foreign target greatly changes
a company’s financial risk exposure, and both FX and IR derivatives reduce deal related financial
risk. Second, hedging experience helps an acquirer evaluate the financial risk associated with the
M&A deal, which can help it choose a better target. An acquirer with hedging capacity may
also be in a better negotiation position so that it can get better deal terms. Third, financial
hedging sends outside investors a positive signal about a firm’s international operation experience
and managerial ability, which can help investors assess deal quality more precisely and reduce
information asymmetry. Fourth, financial hedging reduces deal transaction costs. Firms with
financial hedging are found to experience lower external financing costs (e.g., Campello et al., 2011;
Chen and King, 2014). Finally, because of the relative consistency of a firm’s hedging policy,
an acquirer that hedges its financial risk exposures before the deal announcement is expected to
continue to manage its financial risk exposures after deal completion. The expectation of future
risk reduction of the combined firm will generate a positive stock market reaction at the deal
announcement.8
• Hypothesis (H2): Cross-border M&As carried out by derivatives users have a higher prob-
ability of completion than those carried out by nonusers.
The probability of deal completion will increase with an acquirer’s hedging experience for four
reasons. First, because it is costly to establish hedging programs and the hedging positions will
8We acknowledge that in some cases, an acquirer purchases a foreign target as an operational hedge for its existing
FX risk exposure. This will reduce the benefits of financial hedging and alleviate the positive effect of hedging on
acquirer announcement returns.
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result in a contractual commitment to carry out the deal, a pre-established foreign exchange hedging
position in the target nation’s currency signals the acquirer’s commitment to the deal. Second, an
established financial hedging program can help an acquirer manage deal related financial risk and
reduce the transaction risk exposures. It is less likely for an acquirer with a hedging program to
withdraw a deal due to unexpected and unfavorable market conditions in the exchange rate or the
interest rate. Third, hedging mitigates information asymmetry between investors and managers,
which in turn reduces an acquirer’s stock return volatility. For deals involving stock payments,
target shareholders are thus more willing to accept acquirer stocks. Finally, financial hedging can
lower an acquirer’s external financing costs, so that a derivatives user can offer more competitive
deal terms to the target.
• Hypothesis (H3): Financial derivatives users experience longer deal completion time on
cross-border M&As than nonusers.
Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015) argue that M&A deal completion time is the result of a trade-
off between the costs and benefits of waiting. The use of FCD and IRD can reduce an acquirer’s
financial risk exposure during the interim period, leading to lower waiting costs. Derivatives users
can thus afford to take longer time to review the transaction details and negotiate more favorable
deal terms than nonusers. In other words, because of the reduced FX risk and IR risk in the
interim period, an acquirer with financial hedging programs has less pressure to rush through the
deal and can take more time to appraise the deal terms. Additionally, established hedging programs
demonstrate conservative risk attitude of a acquirer, who is inclined to take more time to carefully
assess the transaction details and potential deal risks.
• Hypothesis (H4): Financial derivatives users have better post deal long-run performance
than nonusers after cross-border M&As.
An acquirer attains increased foreign operations after the cross-border deal completion. This
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changes the acquirer’s FX risk exposures in the long term. As a result, the benefits of hedging may
extend well beyond the deal announcement. Derivatives users may have better long-run performance
than nonusers for the following three reasons. First, related to Hypothesis 3, the more deliberate
deal consideration by derivatives users can lead to higher quality targets and more favorable deal
terms. Second, certain types of derivatives put in place before the deal announcement, such as
swaps, can continue to reduce the combined firm’s risk exposure after deal completion. Finally, an
acquirer who manages its risk exposures before the deal announcement is expected to continue to
manage its exposure post-deal.
4 Data
4.1 Sample selection and variable construction
The data used in this paper are from several sources. We start with all cross-border M&As
with announcement dates between 2000 and 2014 from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Com-
pany (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database.9 We require the acquirer to be publicly
traded in the U.S. and the target to be a foreign company. Applying the standard filters used
in the literature, we then exclude all transactions that are labeled as a minority stake purchase,
acquisition of remaining interest, privatization, repurchase, exchange offer, self-tender, recapital-
ization, or spinoff. We further require a minimum deal value of $1 million and a minimum acquirer
market value of $20 million. In line with previous M&A studies, the percentage of target shares
held by the acquirer is restricted to be less than 10% prior to the transaction and more than 50%
after the transaction. Following Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Bartram et al. (2011), deals
with acquirers from the financial or utilities industry are dropped. This procedure yields an initial
sample of 2, 753 observations. We further set the restriction that acquirers be included in the S&P
9Our sample period begins in 2000 because the U.S. Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB)’s new standard
for disclosure of derivatives transactions, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 133, “Account-
ing for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities”) became effective in June 1999. For detailed information,
please refer to www.fasb.org/summary/stsum133.shtml.
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1500 list when the deals were announced.10 Finally, after merging with the Centre for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, it leaves 1, 385 cross-border M&A deals in our sample.
For each of the 1, 385 M&As, we hand collect the acquirer’s financial hedging data from the
acquirer’s 10-K or 10-K405 reports filed in the fiscal year prior to the deal announcement. All
reports are retrieved from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR electronic
filing system. We require that an acquirer have filed at least one 10-K or 10-K405 report when the
deal was announced. Our final sample consists of 1, 369 deals.11
We focus on the use of foreign currency derivatives and interest rate derivatives because
they are directly related to the management of cross-border M&A risk exposures. Commodity
derivatives information is also collected for our robustness tests. Following the corporate financial
hedging literature,12 we create the following hedging variables: 1) Fcd, a 0/1 binary variable
indicating whether a firm hedges FX risk; 2) Fcd target, a 0/1 binary variable indicating whether
a firm hedges FX risk between the U.S. dollar and the target nation’s currency; 3) Ird, a 0/1
binary variable indicating whether a firm hedges IR risk; 4) Fcd/Ird, a 0/1 binary variable which
equals to 1 if a firm hedges either FX risk or IR risk, and 0 if the firm hedges neither of them; 5)
Hedging scope, a 0/1/2 categorical variable which equals 2 if a firm hedges both FX and IR risk, 1
if a firm hedges only one of these two risks, and 0 if a firm hedges neither of them; 6) Nv derivatives,
the aggregate notional value of FX and IR derivatives, normalized by the acquirers’ total assets;
and 7) Commodity, a 0/1 binary variable indicating whether a firm hedges commodity price risk.
10The S&P 1500, or S&P Composite 1500 index, is compiled by Standard & Poor’s. The index combines all stocks
in three leading indices: the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. It covers approximately
90% of the U.S. stock market capitalization. We restrict our sample to be within the S&P 1500 because certain
control variables, such as corporate governance, are only available for these companies.
11Following the international finance and cross-border M&A literature, we delete observations in which the acquirer
nations are Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Ecuador, and Netherlands Antilles.
12We search the following keywords in acquirer annual reports to locate the information of financial derivatives:
“Item 7A,” “derivative,” “derivative(s) instrument(s),” “hedge,” “financial instrument,” “swap,” “futures,” “forward
contract,” “forward exchange,” “option contract,” “risk management,” “foreign currency,” “currency exchange,”
“notional,” “fair value,” “borrowing,” “debt,” “credit facilities,” “line(s) of credit,” “notes payable,” “commodity,”
“commodities.” This list of keywords is compiled based on those used in previous corporate financial hedging
studies (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Bartram et al.,
2011; Campello et al., 2011). When a key word is found, we read the surrounding text and hand code our hedging
variables.
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We also collect the foreign currency denominated debt information and create a binary indicator
variable, Foreign debt, and use it as a control variable in our empirical analysis.13
We obtain firm accounting data from Compustat, foreign sales information from Compustat
Segments Files, stock return and factor return data from the CRSP, financial analyst data from
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES), and corporate governance information from the
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics). Out of the 1, 369 sample deals, we
are able to collect geographical segment information for 1, 323 of them. Following Allayannis and
Weston (2001), we assume that for the remaining 46 deals, the acquirers have no foreign sales. In
our robustness tests, we obtain the managerial ability scores (Demerjian et al., 2012) from Peter
Demerjian’s website and count the mentions of target nations in acquirers’ 10-K reports. A detailed
description of variables and data sources can be found in Appendix A.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2 shows the distribution of our cross-border M&A sample by announcement year over
the sample period 2000–2014. Consistent with Harford (2005), we find a merger wave pattern in
our sample. The total number of deals drops twice following the burst of the Dot-com bubble in
2000 and the global financial crisis around 2008. The number of deals involving derivatives users
and nonusers exhibits a very similar time-series pattern as the whole sample. Figure 2 also shows
the S&P 1500 index annual return (multiply by 100) and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar index. The
annual deal number exhibits a positive correlation with the S&P 1500 index return. This confirms
the findings documented in previous studies that merger activities are positively correlated with
the valuation of the stock market (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan,
2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). It can also be observed that the trade-weighted U.S. dollar index
exhibits high volatility during our sample period. The volatile exchange rate provides an incentive
for acquirers to use derivatives to reduce cross-border deal related FX risk exposures.
13We supplement the foreign currency debt information using bond data from SDC’s Global New Issues data set.
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the distribution of our cross-border M&A sample by target
nation/region. Our sample includes 1, 369 deals with non-U.S. targets from a total of 58 different
nations/regions. The top five target nations are the U.K. (294), Canada (219), Germany (134),
France (89), and Australia (57). Panel B of Table 1 presents the industry distribution of acquirers
in our sample according to the Fama–French 10 industry classifications (Fama and French, 1997).
Business Equipment, Manufacturing, and Healthcare are the top three industries ranked by M&A
deal number, accounting for a total of 74.6% of our sample observations. Other; Oil, Gas, and Coal;
and Consumer Durables are the three industry groups with the smallest number of observations
and together they account for 13% of total deals. Panel A and B demonstrate that our sample
includes targets from a wide range of nations/regions and acquirers from diversified industries.
Panel C of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our main hedging variables. Among the
1, 369 M&As, 63.2% of acquirers use FCD, 43.2% of acquirers use IRD, and 72.6% acquirers hold
at least one of these two types of derivatives. The proportion of derivatives users in our sample is
higher than those reported in Bartram et al. (2011) (FCD 37.8% and IRD 40.4%) and Campello
et al. (2011) (FCD 27.3% and IRD 35.6%). 14
Since SFAS 133 became effective in 2000, it is no longer mandatory for U.S. public firms
to report the notional value of their derivatives contracts as previously required in SFAS 119.
However, among 994 acquirers with hedging programs in our sample, 820 still voluntarily report
the notional value of their derivatives contracts. On average, the total notional value of FCD and
IRD accounts for 12.9% of the total assets of these acquirers. It is also reported in Panel C that
19.9% of acquirers have outstanding foreign currency denominated debt and 19.8% of acquirers use
commodity derivatives to hedge commodity price risks.15
14Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that the number of public firms using derivatives to manage financial risks
increases over time. Our sample period is 2000–2014, which is later than the sample periods of Bartram et al. (2011)
(2000–2001) and Campello et al. (2011) (1996–2002). In addition, previous hedging studies have shown a positive
relation between firm size and the use of derivatives. Our sample firms are much larger than those in the previous
studies because we focus on S&P 1500 firms capable of carrying out cross-border M&As, while Bartram et al. (2011)
and Campello et al. (2011) do not have such sample restrictions.
15In a survey on 392 chief financial officers by Graham and Harvey (2001), 85.8% of the participants choose
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Panel D of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our key dependent variables of interest:
acquirer announcement return (CAR [-5, 5]), deal completion probability (Completion), number
of days between M&A announcement and deal completion (Completion time), acquirer long-run
operating performance (4AROA t,t+3), and acquirer long-run stock performance (BHAR 3Y).
Summary statistics for the full, derivatives users, and nonusers samples are reported. On average,
financial derivatives users have significantly better announcement returns, longer deal completion
time, and better long-run performance than nonusers. The difference in deal completion probability
between user and nonuser samples is not statistically significant.
Panel E of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of deal and acquirer characteristics.
We report the number of observations, mean, and standard deviation of each variable for the
full, derivatives user, and nonuser sample, respectively. The last column presents the statistical
significance of mean difference tests between the derivatives user and nonuser samples. In total,
we have 1, 276 completed deals and 93 withdrawn deals. Deals made by derivatives users have a
higher absolute transaction value but lower relative deal size against acquirer size. Deals made by
derivatives users are also less likely to involve equity as a payment method. Hedgers are more likely
to have larger firm size, higher leverage, and greater pre-deal ROA. On the other hand, hedgers are
found to have smaller cash holding, Runup, and Sigma. We do not find a statistically significant
difference in Tobin’s Q between the user and nonuser groups.16
“providing a ‘natural hedge’ ” as an important factor in their decision about issuing foreign debt. In a recent study,
Clark and Judge (2016) compare the effect on firm value of different FX hedging strategies and conclude that financial
derivatives are used by firms to hedge short term risk exposures while foreign currency denominated debts are used
to hedge long term risk exposures. Previous hedging studies have also examined the use of commodity derivatives for
firms in certain industries with strong commodity price risk exposure (e.g., Jin and Jorion, 2006; Carter et al., 2006).
Commodity price risk is not directly related to cross-border M&A and only affects a small number of industries, so
hedging by commodity derivatives are expected to be much less correlated with deal outcomes than hedging by FCD
or IRD.
16This does not conflict with the findings in previous hedging literature, because Tobin’s Q is not compared cross-
sectionally in our sample.
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5 Empirical results
5.1 Financial hedging and acquirer CARs: OLS
To examine the effect of financial hedging on cross-border deal performance, we study acquirer
CARs estimated by a market model with the CRSP value-weighted index. Following Golubov et al.
(2015), the market model is estimated using at least 30 non-missing daily return data over the
(−300,−91) period prior to the deal announcement. Acquirer CARs are measured over a window
of (−5, +5), where day 0 is the deal announcement date.17
Table 2 reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard
errors for the 1, 276 completed deals. The dependent variables in all seven regressions are ac-
quirer announcement CARs. The independent variables of interest are corporate financial hedging
proxy variables: the foreign currency derivatives user indicator (Fcd), the derivatives user indicator
(Fcd/Ird),18 the hedging scope indicator (Hedging scope), and the notional value of financial deriva-
tives normalized by acquirers’ total assets (NV derivatives). We control for year, Fama–French 10
industry, and S&P index fixed effects in all regressions.
In columns 1–4, Fcd is the key independent variable of interest. In column 1, we do not
include any control variables. We control for deal characteristics in column 2 and then add acquirer
characteristics in column 3. In column 4, we add one more control variable, Foreign debt, to
control for the impact of foreign currency denominated debt on acquirer FX exposures (Kedia
and Mozumdar, 2003; Allayannis et al., 2003; Clark and Judge, 2016). The coefficients of Fcd
remain positive and statistically significant in all four regressions. These results show that acquirers
engaged in FX risk hedging activities have significantly higher announcement CARs than acquiers
17As a robustness check, we also estimate the market model over the alternative period of (−260,−60), (−200,−20),
and (−200,−60), and check alternative CAR estimation windows of (−3,+5) and (−1,+5). In addition, we estimate
acquirer CARs using the Fama–French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) and the Carhart four-factor
model (Carhart, 1997). The results are qualitatively the same using these specifications.
18We do not include Ird as an independent hedging variable because the direct effect of IR risk hedging on acquirer
CARs is conditional on the issuance of debt by acquirers to finance cross-border M&As. Instead, we include Fcd/Ird
as a hedging variable to account for whether an acquirer has an established hedging program or not.
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that do not. The improvement of CARs is not only statistically significant but also economically
important. Using the regression model specified in column 4, we estimate that foreign currency
derivatives users experience an average 1.0% higher announcement CARs than nonusers. This is
equivalent to an increase of $193.7 million shareholder value for an average-sized acquirer.
We then replace the hedging variable of Fcd with Fcd/Ird, which is a broader indicator
of hedging that takes into account the use of both foreign currency derivatives and interest rate
derivatives. The coefficient of Fcd/Ird is also positive and statistically significant as reported in
column 5. The hedging effect remains statistically significant when we use Hedging scope as the
hedging variable in column 6 and NV derivatives19 in column 7. Overall, our results are consistent
with Hypothesis 1 that derivatives users have higher acquirer CARs than nonusers. In addition, we
find acquirers that hedge more types of risks (Hedging scope) and have higher derivatives contract
values (NV derivatives) experience higher announcement returns.
5.2 Financial hedging and acquirer CARs: Heckman two-stage procedure
The endogeneity concern on our test results emerges if financial hedging decisions are not
randomly distributed among firms, but are related to certain unobservable firm characteristics that
have a positive impact on acquirer announcement returns. If that is the case, an acquirer who
uses financial derivatives would have higher CARs no matter it engages in financial hedging or
not. The ideal approach to address this self-selection bias is to compare deal outcomes of the same
acquirer, with and without financial hedging. Since this is not practical, we adopt the Heckman
treatment effect model: a linear regression model augmented with an endogenous binary treatment
variable (Heckman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2010). The estimation is conducted by a two-step consistent
estimator. The first-step treatment equation models the choice of using financial derivatives, and
19Over our sample period 2000–2014, U.S. public companies are only required to report the fair value of their
derivatives positions but not the notional value. Although we find that most companies who report derivative
information in their annual report choose to report both values, the notional value of derivatives as measured by
NV derivatives is a still a noisy proxy for hedging and suffers self-selection biases in reporting. Therefore, we focus
on hedging indicator variables in the rest of our empirical analysis.
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the second-step outcome equation corrects for the omitted variables and selection biases.
The key to implementing the two-step treatment effect estimation is to identify instrument
variables that strongly correlate to a firm’s hedging decision but not its announcement return.
We employ two instrument variables in our tests: Analyst number and Foreign sales/Sales. Geczy
et al. (1997) find that both the number of financial analyst firms following and the ratio of foreign
sales to total sales are related to the likelihood that a firm uses currency derivatives. The number
of following financial analysts may measure information asymmetry so that more analyst following
is positively related to the availability of information, leading to a less need for managers to use
derivatives hedging as a signaling tool (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). An alternative explanation is
that the number of following analysts is a proxy for the pressure that managers receive on their firm
performance (Geczy et al., 1997). Thus, the more analysts following a firm, the higher probability
that the firm will engage in financial hedging to reduce the variation in firm performance. The ratio
of foreign sales to total sales measures an acquirer’s exposure to foreign currency risk before the
M&A deal. Therefore, higher foreign currency risk exposure is associated with greater potential
hedging benefits and leads to a higher probability of FX hedging (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003).20
Table 3 presents the two-step treatment effect test results. In the first-step treatment re-
gressions, we conduct probit tests in which the dependent variable of interest is Fcd in model 1–2
and Fcd/Ird in model 3–4. Analyst number is the instrument variable employed in model 1 and 3,
while Foreign sales/Sales is the instrument variable employed in model 2 and 4. The coefficients
of both instrument variables are statistically significant in the first-step treatment equations. In
the second-step outcome equations, the dependent variables are acquirer CARs estimated by the
20The pairwise correlation between acquirer CARs and the number of following financial analysts is -0.09, and
the pairwise correlation between acquirer CARs and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales is 0.03. To avoid overi-
dentification, we use Analyst number and Foreign sales/Sales separately as instrument variables in the first-step
treatment equation. Our results are qualitatively the same when we combine the two instrument variables together
in the first-step treatment equation. Unlike the standard instrumental variables and two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regressions, the Heckman model does not require exclusion restrictions to be estimated (e.g., Li and Prabhala, 2007;
Golubov et al., 2012). The relevance condition of our two instruments is examined in the first-stage regression. The
corresponding p-value for the joint test whether the excluded instruments are significant is 0.000, suggesting that the
relevance condition is satisfied.
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market model. Similar to the OLS regression results, the coefficients of Fcd and Fcd/Ird are both
positive and statistically significant in the second-step regressions. The Heckman two-stage test
results confirm our findings on the positive relation between hedging and acquirers CARs when
endogeneity is addressed.
5.3 Other deal related outcomes
In this section, we investigate whether financial hedging affects the deal completion proba-
bility and deal completion time.
5.3.1 Financial hedging and deal completion probability
Columns 1–4 of Table 4 report the results of the probit regressions of deal completion proba-
bilities on three measures of acquirer financial hedging activities: Fcd, Fcd/Ird, and Fcd target. In
the first two regressions, the coefficients of the financial hedging variables, Fcd and Fcd/Ird, are not
statistically significant. In the remaining regressions, the hedging variable employed is Fcd target,
which is a dichotomous variable indicating if the acquirer uses currency derivatives specifically to
hedge the target nation’s currency risk. We find the regression coefficients for Fcd target to be
positive and statistically significant in the probit regressions reported in columns 3 and 4. This
suggests that if an acquirer holds the target nation’s currency derivatives contracts prior to the
deal announcement, the probability of deal completion is higher. Using the model specification of
column 4 as an example, the untabulated marginal effect coefficients show that holding all the other
independent variables at their mean value, acquirers that hedge the target country’s currency risk
have a 4% higher probability of completing their deals than acquirers that do not. As a robustness
check, we then conduct a logit regression with the same control variables as column 4. The re-
sults are reported in column 5, which show that the coefficient of Fcd target remains positive and
statistically significant. Overall our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Apart from the impact of the hedging policy, we find that a deal is more likely to be successful
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when the target is a non-public rather than a public firm. One possible explanation is that shares of
private companies are more concentrated (Golubov et al., 2012) and the voting process for private
companies is less complicated than for public companies. We also find that acquirers with better
governance mechanisms exhibit stronger abilities to get their deals closed. Consistent with Golubov
et al. (2012), we find that tender offers have a positive effect on the deal completion probability,
while hostile deals and sigma value have a negative effect on the chance of deal completion.
5.3.2 Financial hedging and deal completion time
The univariate tests in Panel D of Table 1 show that it takes FX derivatives users an average
of 53 days to close a deal, while it takes nonusers an average of 42 days to do so. Table 5 reports
the tobit regression 21 results on how an acquirer’s hedging behavior affects its deal completion
time. The dependent variable is Completion time, which is defined as the number of calendar
days between the deal announcement date and deal completion date. Various acquirer and deal
characteristics are controlled for in the regressions. Similar to the univariate test results, we find
that all coefficients of hedging variables are positive and statistically significant. This is consistent
with Hypothesis 3 that it takes derivatives users longer to close cross-border M&As deals than
nonusers. Specifically, it takes an acquirer with FX hedging experience 32 days more to com-
plete a cross-border M&A than a firm without such experience, after controlling for deal and firm
characteristics.
Besides the hedging variables, our results are consistent with Golubov et al. (2012) that deals
involving acquirers and targets from the same industry and deals with a large transaction value
relative to acquirer size have a longer completion time, while deals made by acquirers whose stocks
experience high volatility prior to the deal announcement have a shorter completion time. We
also find that acquirers’ outstanding foreign currency denominated debt has a significantly positive
21In our cross-border M&A sample, some deals have a completion time of 1 day. The tobit regression adjusts for
the left-censoring observations at 1.
22
effect on deal completion time. In addition, we find that tender offers have a negative effect on
completion time in cross-border M&As.22
5.4 Financial hedging and long-term performance
Our analysis so far suggests that derivatives users take a longer time to negotiate and com-
plete deals, have a higher deal completion probability, and, most importantly, experience higher
announcement returns than nonusers. In this section, we explore whether the benefits of hedging
are capitalized in acquirer long-term performance. In particular, we explore the difference in both
long-term operating performance and stock performance between derivatives users and nonusers.
Following Huson et al. (2004) and Guercio et al. (2008), we use changes in abnormal operating
return on assets (4AROA) to measure acquirer post-merger long-term operating performance. We
first compute ROA as the ratio of operating income to the book value of total assets. Then, following
Barber and Lyon (1996), we adjust an acquirer’s ROA by subtracting the median ROA of a control
group of firms that are from the same industry (2-digit SIC code) and have similar prior operating
performance (±10% ROA).23 This procedure generates adjusted return on assets (AROA), which
controls for the mean reversion in the accounting performance of firms experiencing substantial
corporate events or extreme performance. Lastly, we compute the change in AROA (4AROA)
over a three-year window starting from the deal announcement.
Columns 1–3 of Table 6 present the multivariate regression results of hedging on acquirer
long-term operating performance. We use three measures to identify acquirers’ hedging programs:
Fcd, Fcd/Ird, and Hedging scope. After controlling for various acquirer and deal characteristics,
the coefficients of the three hedging measures are all positive and statistically significant. Our
results show that financial hedging improves an acquirer’s long-term operating performance after
22Tender offers are not common in cross-border M&As. In our sample only about 6% of the deals involve tender
offers.
23When the above criteria yield no firms in the control group, we relax the same 2-digit SIC code requirement to
the same 1-digit SIC code, or further remove the industry requirement completely. If we still cannot find any firms
in the control group, we choose the firm with the closest ROA in the fiscal year prior to the deal announcement.
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cross-border M&As. The impact is more pronounced for acquirers that hedge more types of risk
exposures. On average, the use of FX derivatives increases acquirer 4AROA by 0.7% over three
years after the deal announcement.
We next examine the post-deal long-term stock performance of acquirers. As noted by Kothari
and Warner (2007), risk adjustment is critically important in assessing the long-term performance
of event studies, and risk should be estimated based on the stock performance after the event. To
measure post-deal long-term stock performance, we calculate BHAR by the control-firm method in
order to reduce any biases resulting from new listing, rebalancing, and skewness. Following Barber
and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999), for each acquirer in our sample, we identify a firm with
similar size and book-to-market ratio as the benchmark. Furthermore, as pointed out by Duchin
and Schmidt (2013), one of the major concerns about long-term event studies in M&As is the
clustering of merger activities at the industry level, which could result in biased testing results if
we assume the independence of stock returns across different firms. To mitigate this concern, we
further require benchmark firms to be in the same industry as the acquirers. In summary, we match
each acquirer with a firm from the same industry (2-digit SIC code), of similar size (±10%), and
with the closest book-to-market ratio. The BHAR are calculated over a three-year window after
the deal announcement.24
Columns 4–6 of Table 6 presents the results on long-term stock performance test. After con-
trolling for various acquirer and deal characteristics, the coefficients of the three hedging measures
are positive and statistically significant. Our results show that financial hedging is associated with
increased acquirer long-term stock performance. The impact is more pronounced for acquirers that
hedge more types of risk exposures. On average, the use of FX derivatives increases acquirer annual
BHAR by 0.4% over three years after the deal announcement.
Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with Hypothesis 4 and illustrate that the benefits
24We repeat our tests with long-term performance measured over a four-year and five-year time window, respec-
tively. The results are qualitatively the same and are available upon request.
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of hedging for acquirers extend well beyond short-term performance improvement. Over a longer
time horizon, both the operating performance and stock market performance of derivatives users
surpass those of nonusers.
6 Robustness tests and further discussions
In this section, we discuss the alternative explanations of our findings and present robustness
test results.
6.1 Alternative explanations and omitted variables
The acquirer’s financial hedging decision may be related to omitted factors that also affect
M&A outcomes. To address this concern, we investigate whether the positive relation between
financial hedging and acquirer CARs can be explained by a series of alternative explanations.
6.1.1 Financial hedging and managerial ability
One alternative explanation for the positive effect of financial hedging on deal performance
is that both hedging and deal performance are driven by manager quality. Derivatives using may
just be the result of talented management teams and good business strategies. To examine whether
“better managerial ability” is the only interpretation of our results, we specifically control for
managerial ability in our regressions and check the robustness of our results.
Demerjian et al. (2012) apply data envelopment analysis and build a managerial ability score
index based on a manager’s efficiency in transforming corporate resources to revenues. They find
that this managerial ability index is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and can explain
the stock price reaction to CEO turnovers. We obtain managerial ability score (Managerial score)
data between 2000 and 2011 from Peter Demerjian’s website25 and include Managerial score as a
25http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj.
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control variable in our analysis.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the test results of financial hedging on acquirer CARs after
controlling for managerial ability. We use the endogenous binary-treatment model estimated by a
two-step consistent estimator, with similar specifications to the models shown in Table 3. only the
second-step outcome equation regression results are reported. The coefficients of Fcd and Fcd/Ird
remain positive and statistically significant in all the outcome equations, suggesting that “better
managerial ability” story cannot fully account for our findings. The coefficient of Managerial score
is statistically significant but negative. An explanation consistent with this result is the hubris
hypothesis (e.g., Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2005) that good past performance tends to
induce CEO hubris so that acquirers choose improper targets or overpay deal premium, leading to
an inferior deal performance.
6.1.2 Acquirer CARs and foreign operating exposures
If an acquirer has foreign operation in the target firm’s country before the M&A deal, then
it may be motivated to hedge its FX risk related to its foreign operating exposures. On the other
hand, an acquirer with target country operation experience may also make better cross-border M&A
decisions. Thus, it might be the acquirer’s knowledge of foreign markets rather than the financial
hedging itself that leads to the improved deal performance documented in our empirical tests. In
this section, we address the concern that omitting an acquirer’s pre-deal operating exposures in the
target nation may introduce an estimation bias in our empirical analysis.
Since foreign sales and foreign production information on the country level is not disclosed
by the acquirers, we adopt an alternative approach to measure their foreign exposures. Garcia and
Norli (2012) extract state name counts from 10-K reports and use the counts as a measure of the
degree of geographic dispersion of firm business operations. Following their approach, we count
the number of mentions of foreign target nations (Counts) in acquirer 10-K reports prior to the
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deal announcement.26 The variable Counts is used as a proxy for an acquirer’s foreign operation
experience and knowledge of the target nation before the M&A deal.
Panel B of Table 7 presents the test results of financial hedging on acquirer CARs after con-
trolling for acquirer foreign operation experience. We use the endogenous binary-treatment model
estimated by a two-step consistent estimator. Only the second-step outcome equation regression
results are reported. The coefficient of Counts is found to be statistically insignificant in our results.
The coefficients of Fcd and Fcd/Ird remain positive and statistically significant in all the outcome
equations.
6.1.3 Acquirer CARs and serial acquirers
Some deals in our sample are carried out by repeated acquirers. If the improvement on ac-
quirer CARs is driven by the frequent acquirers who are also more likely to use derivatives, then
the conclusion of our empirical results is compromised. In our sample of 1,369 cross-border M&A
deals, there are 639 unique acquirers, about half of whom (316) carry out a single transaction in our
sample. There is a group of 55 frequent acquirers who carry out at least five deals. In order to ad-
dress the concern that our results are driven by these frequent acquirers, we repeat our multivariate
tests after dropping the deals made by these repeated acquirers from our sample. In untabulated
test results, we find that hedging variables remain positively related to deal performance. Apart
from the concern discussed above, recent M&A studies also demonstrate that if an acquirer makes
a series of acqusitions, the acquirer CARs may decline as it conduct more deals (e.g., Billett and
Qian, 2008; Aktas et al., 2011). We control for the variable Serial acquirer in the outcome equation
of the endogenous binary-treatment model. Serial acquirer is defined as the number of deals carried
out by the same acquirer before the deal announcement in our sample. As shown in Panel C of
Table 7, our results are robust after controlling for the serial acquirer effect.
26The variations, including official names, unofficial names, and their adjectival forms, are all considered when we
count the mentions of target nations.
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6.1.4 Acquirer CARs and commodity derivatives
Besides FX and IR derivatives, companies may also use commodity derivatives for hedging
purpose. Empirical studies on commodity price hedging usually examine firms in industries with
strong risk exposure to commodity prices.27
One alternative interpretation of our empirical findings on the positive relation between
acquirer CARs and financial hedging is that the better deal performance is driven by unobserved
firm qualities that lead firms to hedge, instead of driven by hedging practice itself. In other words,
financial hedging may have no causal effect on deal performance but only signals unobserved firm
qualities. If this explanation is true, then the use of commodity derivatives should have similar
correlations with acquirer announcement returns as the use of FCD or IRD.
To check on this alternative interpretation, we add Commodity as a control variable in the
outcome equation of the endogenous binary-treatment model. Commodity is a binary variable that
is equal to 1 if an acquirer reports using commodity derivatives, and 0 otherwise. Panel D of Table
7 shows that the coefficients of Fcd and Fcd/Ird remain positive and statistically significant in
all the outcome equations. The coefficients of Commodity in the outcome equations are mostly
negative and statistically insignificant. In untabulated tests, we examine the impact of commodity
price hedging on acquirer CARs without controlling for FCD and IRD. We find that the commodity
derivatives alone cannot contribute to better deal performance. These findings alleviate the concern
that financial hedging only signals hidden firm characteristics.
Finally, we include all four control variables: Managerial score, Counts, Serial acquirer, and
Commodity together in the multivariate regressions shown in Panel E of Table 7. We continue to
find that financial hedging is positively related to acquirer CARs.
27For example, Carter et al. (2006) study the use of jet fuel derivatives in a sample of U.S. airline companies and
find that commodity price hedging is positively related to Tobin’s Q. By focusing on a sample of oil refiners, Mackay
and Moeller (2007) also find similar results.
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6.1.5 Acquirer CARs and financial hedging: unobservable firm characteristics
To further control for the unobserved acquirer or target characteristics that could affect both
financial hedging and acquirer CARs, we follow Gormley and Matsa (2014) and control for the triple
fixed effects of Year × Acquirer Fama–French 10 industry × Target Fama–French 10 industry.28
For all seven OLS regressions in Table 2, we re-estimate them with the triple fixed effects model.
Results in Table 8 show that our empirical results presented in Table 2 remain robust.
6.2 Alternative endogeneity control method: propensity score matching (PSM)
In section 5.2, we apply the Heckman selection model to control for the endogeneity concern
due to self-selection bias and unobserved firm characteristics. As an alternative approach, we follow
Bartram et al. (2011) and employ a self-selection control method, PSM, by matching the derivatives
users with a group of nonusers with similar pre-acquisition firm characteristics.
For each acquirer, we generate a propensity score which is estimated by a logit model. The
dependent variable in the logit model is Fcd, and the independent variables include Leverage,
Cash/assets, Governance, Tobin’s Q, and Relative size. We choose these independent variables be-
cause Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that the independent variables in the first step regression
should strongly affect the implementation of financial hedging program and at least weakly affect
the outcome variables. Then we match deals carried out by derivatives users with those carried
out by a group of nonusers based on their propensity scores. Both nearest-neighbour matching
and Gaussian kernel matching methods are applied. The differences in deal outcomes between
derivatives users and nonusers are then estimated and reported in Table 9. Our findings in section
5 remain robust with the PSM approach.
28We thank Todd A. Gormley for providing the computer code of the high dimensional fixed effect model online
at www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/matsa/htm/fe.htm.
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6.3 Currency volatility and announcement returns
Market uncertainty is critically influential on M&A activities. In cross-border M&As, high
currency volatility introduces great uncertainty for the deals. High currency volatility not only
increases an acquirer’s payment risk during the interim period, but also increases its subsequent
cash flow risk and balance-sheet risk. As a result, we expect that financial hedging will have a
greater impact on deal performance during a high exchange rate volatility regime than during a
low exchange rate volatility regime.
In the internet Appendix C1, we use the standard deviations of 12 monthly trade-weighted
U.S. dollar index returns prior to the deal announcement and the standard deviations of 12 monthly
returns of exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and the target nation’s currency prior to the deal
announcement as two measures of foreign currency volatility. Then we run OLS regressions of
acquirer CARs on acquirer’s financial hedging proxy variables over high currency volatility and
low currency volatility periods, respectively. We find that the coefficients for all financial hedging
measures are positive and statistically significant when the deals are announced following a period
of high currency volatility, but the coefficients become positive yet statistically insignificant when
they are announced after a period of low currency volatility. These findings lend support to the
notion that financial hedging improves acquirer performance through risk reduction and the effect
is more significant during volatile times.
6.4 Other hedging methods
Besides hedging with derivatives, financial hedging with foreign currency debt and operational
hedging are also commonly used methods by firms to reduce their foreign currency exposures. A
firm with foreign currency risk exposures may finance its operation in the local nation’s currency
to create a natural hedge (Graham and Harvey, 2001). This approach is commonly used by firms
with long-term exposures of foreign currency risk (Clark and Judge, 2016). In our main tests, we
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include foreign currency denominated debt as a control variable and the coefficients of our hedging
proxies are statistically significant. This is not surprising given that a portion of risk exposures
associated with cross-border M&As are in the near future and at a predictable amount, which
can most effectively be managed by financial derivatives hedging. Our findings suggest that it is
beneficial for acquirers to hedge these risk exposures with financial derivatives, even if the certain
acquirers may adopt natural hedge through borrowing in local currencies as a complement.
Operational hedging refers to the strategy that a firm relocates its production facilities or
shifts its source of inputs in order to match the costs and revenues in the same currency. Kim
et al. (2006) find a substitute relation between financial hedging and operational hedging for non-
financial firms. Hankins (2011) finds that for a sample of firms in the U.S. financial industry, M&As
provide operational hedging by reducing the volatility of the combined entity’s operational income.
We cannot rule out that certain cross-border acquisitions in our sample are for operational hedging
purpose. If this is the case, then the marginal benefits of derivatives hedging will be smaller. The
fact that we find a significant effect of financial hedging on deal performance, given that some deals
may be carried out for the operational hedging purpose, only makes our findings more significant.
6.5 Target country fixed effects
In our sample, an acquirer may have different risk exposures in different target countries
and the difference is not random. Thus it may be necessary to control for target country fixed
effects. The tests in section 6.3 are a sub-sample analysis based on country to country exchange
rate volatilities, which partially addresses target country fixed effects. To further address this issue,
we re-estimate the OLS regressions in Panel A of Table 2 and control for target country fixed effects.
The test results remain qualitatively the same as reported in Panel A of Table 2.29
29The untabulated test results are available upon request.
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6.6 Financial hedging and acquirer stock return volatility
High stock return volatility leads to higher external financing costs and more uncertainty on
payments if the method of payment includes stock swaps. From a large sample of international
firms, Bartram et al. (2011) find strong evidence that the use of financial derivatives reduces both
total risk and systematic risk. We examine the effect of hedging on stock return volatility in our
sample as a performance test.
The stock return volatility measure we adopt is the implied volatility at the deal announce-
ment, which reflects the market’s expectation of an acquirer’s future stock volatility. Following
Duchin and Schmidt (2013), we collect acquirers’ implied volatility data from the estimated volatil-
ity surface in the Option Metric database for ATM options with time to maturity of 91 days30 and
calculate the average implied volatility of ATM call and put options. In the internet Appendix C2,
we use both univariate and multivariate tests to show that derivatives users have lower market per-
ceived future stock return uncertainty than nonusers at announcement dates. On average, hedging
with FX derivatives reduces an acquirer’s 91-day implied volatility by 0.047 at the announcement
date.
6.7 Financial hedging reported after the deal announcement
The financial hedging data employed in this study are collected from the acquirer’s annual
report filed prior to the deal announcement. This practice is consistent with the standard event
study approach in M&A literature and mitigates the reverse causality concern. However, some
deal specific hedging activities by acquirers may occur during the fiscal years when the M&As are
announced and are subsequently disclosed in the 10-K reports available after the deal announce-
ment. In this case, the financial hedging information reported after the deal announcement would
also be of interest. In addition, given that deal specific hedging information is not disclosed by all
30We also collect data for options with time to maturity of 30 days and 60 days. Our test results are qualitatively
the same and are available upon request.
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acquirers, the change of financial hedging activities reported in the two consecutive annual reports
before and after deal announcement can offer some insight on deal related hedging activities. To
further explore the link between hedging programs and cross-border M&A activities, we hand col-
lect acquirers’ financial hedging data from their annual reports filed for the fiscal years in which
the deals are announced.31
In the untabulated results, we find that the means of Fcd, Fcd target, Hedging scope,
Nv derivatives, and Foreign debt are significantly higher in the annual reports filed after the deal
announcement than those before the deal announcement, suggesting that in anticipation of deal
completion, the acquirers increase their FX hedging activities around the deal announcement. The
hedging activities related to IR risk and commodity price risk do not increase significantly over the
two-year time period. Furthermore, we find that financial hedging activities reported after the deal
announcement have a similar effect on acquirer announcement returns as those reported before the
deal announcement. The results in Table 3 are robust when we use Fcd and Fcd/Ird reported after
the deal announcement as the independent variable for hedging. Finally, we calculate the change
of hedging activities between the two fiscal years (∆Hedging scope and ∆Nv derivatives) and find
that both of them have a positive effect on acquirer announcement returns.
7 Conclusions
Using hand-collected data on reported derivatives information by S&P 1500 firms that ac-
quire foreign targets between 2000 and 2014, we empirically examine whether financial hedging
affects cross-border M&A deal performance. Our sample acquirers encounter an increase in for-
eign exchange risk, as well as interest rate risk if a deal needs external financing. With an event
study approach, we find that derivatives users have higher announcement returns than nonusers.
The improvement on acquirer CARs is both statistically and economically significant. Over a time
31We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
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window of (−5, +5) around the deal announcement, foreign currency derivatives users experience
an average 1% higher abnormal returns than nonusers. Besides improved acquirer CARs, we show
that financial hedging correlates with higher deal completion probabilities, longer deal completion
time, and better long-term acquirer performance.
Overall, our results are consistent with the optimal hedging theory that financial hedging
improves firm value when market frictions exist. To address the endogeneity concern, we use the
Heckman treatment effect model to control for hidden variables that may be correlated with both
hedging decision and deal performance. In our robustness tests, we apply both the PSM and the
triple fixed effects models to further mitigate potential endogeneity. To rule out the alternative
explanations of our results, we conduct a series of robustness tests to directly control for specific
firm or deal characteristics, including firm size, stock return momentum, managerial ability, foreign
operating exposures, repeated acquirers, and target country fixed effects. Our results remain robust
after controlling for these variables. Adding commodity price hedging as a control variable, we find
that unlike foreign exchange and interest rate hedging, commodity hedging does not correlate
with better deal performance. This lends support to the notion that hidden firm characteristics
motivating firms to hedge cannot fully explain the improved deal performance. Furthermore, by
separating our sample period into a low exchange rate regime and a high exchange rate regime,
we confirm that hedging related acquirer performance improvement is more pronounced during a
high currency volatility regime than a low currency volatility regime. This reinforces the notion
that hedging benefits firms through risk exposure reduction. Lastly we show that the implied
volatility for derivatives users is lower than for nonusers during the deal announcement window.
The observed risk reduction effect is consistent with Bartram et al. (2011).
Our findings contribute to the extant literature on the link between hedging and firm value
improvement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to directly examine the relation between
hedging and the performance of a firm’s investment activity. Similar to previous M&A studies, we
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only observe and examine deals that are made public. Boone and Mulherin (2007) find that public
takeover activities are only the tip of the iceberg of total takeover activities. It is possible that
some deals are not made public due to the lack of acquirer capacity to manage deal related risks,
which further emphasizes the importance of financial hedging in cross-border M&As. The current
U.S. financial statement reporting standards do not require firms to disclose deal specific hedging
information. Therefore we follow the practice of the extant empirical hedging studies and collect
general hedging information at the firm level. If changes in financial reporting standards make
more detailed corporate hedging data available in the future, we would be able to not only study
the relation between hedging and cross-border M&As more thoroughly but also examine hedging’s
impact on other types of firm operation.
35
Appendix A
See Table A1.
Table A1: Variable definitions
This table provides variable definitions and corresponding data sources. CRSP refers to the Centre
for Research in Security Prices, FF refers to Kenneth French’s website at Dartmouth, SDC refers
to Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company, IBES refers to the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System, ISS refers to the Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics), and EDGAR
refers to the SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval.
Variable Definition Source
Deal outcomes
CAR [X,Y ] Cumulative abnormal returns over the event window [X,Y ]
days surrounding the acquisition announcement, using the
market model with the CRSP value-weighted index.
CRSP
Completion 1 for completed deals, 0 for withdrawn deals. SDC/LexisNexis
Completion time Number of days between announcement and effective dates. SDC/LexisNexis
AROA Acquirer abnormal return on assets (AROA) with the
benchmark being the median ROA of a group of Compustat
firms within the same 2-digit SIC code and similar operating
performance (±10% ROA) before the deal announcement.
Compustat
BHAR (Control Firm) Acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal stock return with the
benchmark being the return of a control firm with the same
2-digit SIC code, similar size (±10%), and the nearest
book-to-market ratio.
Compustat/CRSP
/FF Data Library
Implied volatility The implied volatility of acquirer stock returns at the deal
announcement. It is the average implied volatilities of the
at-the-money (ATM) call option and the ATM put option
with the same maturity.
Option Metrics
Deal characteristics
Cash 1 for deals financed fully with cash, 0 otherwise. SDC
Equity 1 for deals financed partially or fully with stock, 0 otherwise. SDC
Nonpublic 1 if the target is not a public firm, 0 otherwise. SDC
Toehold 1 if the acquirer has already held a certain percentage of the
target shares at the announcement, 0 otherwise.
SDC
Hostile 1 for hostile deals, 0 otherwise. SDC
Tender 1 for tender offers, 0 otherwise. SDC
Related industry 1 if the target and the acquirer have the same 2-digit SIC
code, 0 otherwise.
SDC
Relative size The ratio of transaction value to acquirer market value at the
end of the fiscal year before the deal is announced.
SDC/Compustat
Transaction value Value of transaction, in million dollars. SDC
Firm characteristics
Size Natural log of acquirer’s market value, adjusted for inflation. Compustat
Tobin’s Q Acquirer’s Tobin’s Q at the end of the fiscal year before the
deal is announced, following Baker and Wurgler (2002).
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Leverage Acquirer’s ratio of book value of debt to book value of total
assets in fiscal year end before the deal is announced.
Compustat
Cash/assets Acquirer’s cash, normalized by total assets. Compustat
Governance We construct a corporate governance index based on six
provisions (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Each acquirer is given a
score, from 0 to 6, based on the number of these provisions
which the company has before the announcement: staggered
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for
mergers and charter amendments.
ISS
Runup Market adjusted buy-and-hold return of the acquirer’s stock
over a (−205,−6) window (Golubov et al., 2012).
CRSP
Sigma Standard deviation of the acquirer’s market-adjusted daily
return over a (−205,−6) window (Golubov et al., 2012).
CRSP
Assets Book value of acquirer total assets . Compustat
Analyst number Number of analysts following the acquirer in the fiscal year
preceding the deal announcement (Geczy et al., 1997).
IBES
Foreign sales/Sales The ratio of the acquirer’s foreign sales over its total sales at
the end of the fiscal year preceding the deal announcement.
Compustat
Segments
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Compustat
Managerial score A measure of managerial ability based on managers’ efficiency
in generating revenues (Demerjian et al., 2012).
Peter Demerjian’s
website
Counts The number of mentions of the target country in the
acquirer’s 10-K report prior to the deal announcement.
EDGAR 10-K
Serial acquirer The number of deals carried out by the same acquirer before
the deal announcement in our sample.
SDC
Acquirer financial hedging characteristics
Fcd 1 if the acquirer uses foreign currency derivatives in the fiscal
year before the deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
EDGAR 10-K
Fcd target 1 if the acquirer uses the target nation’s currency derivatives
in the fiscal year before the deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
EDGAR 10-K
Ird 1 if the acquirer uses interest rate derivatives in the fiscal year
before the deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
EDGAR 10-K
Fcd/Ird 1 if the acquirer uses either foreign currency derivatives or
interest rate derivatives in the fiscal year before the deal
announcement, 0 otherwise.
EDGAR 10-K
Hedging scope 2 if the acquirer uses both of the two types of derivatives
contracts (FX and IR) in the fiscal year before the deal
announcement, 1 if the acquirer uses only one of the two types
of derivatives contracts (FX or IR), 0 if the acquirer does not
use foreign currency derivatives or interest rate derivatives.
EDGAR 10-K
Nv derivatives Notional value of the financial derivatives contracts held by
the acquirer at the end of the fiscal year before the deal
announcement, normalized by the acquirer’s total assets.
EDGAR 10-K
Foreign debt 1 if the acquirer uses debt denominated in foreign currencies
in the fiscal year before the deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
EDGAR 10-K/SDC
Global New Issues
Commodity 1 if the acquirer uses commodity derivatives contracts in the
fiscal year before the deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
EDGAR 10-K
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Table 2: Acquirer announcement returns estimated by the market model and financial hedging
This table presents the regression results of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on financial
hedging variables. The OLS regressions with robust standard errors are based on a sample of 1,274 completed
deals that are carried out by S&P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014. The dependent variable is the acquirer
CAR over the 11-day event window (−5, +5) where 0 is the announcement day. The benchmark is estimated
by the market model with the CRSP value-weighted index over the pre-announcement window (−300,−91).
Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix A. Year, Fama–French 10 industry, and S&P
index fixed effects are controlled for all regressions. P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fcd 0.012** 0.011** 0.010* 0.010*
(0.016) (0.032) (0.055) (0.056)
Fcd/Ird 0.011*
(0.055)
Hedging scope 0.005*
(0.098)
Nv derivatives 0.015**
(0.036)
Cash -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.984) (0.844) (0.850) (0.815) (0.825) (0.847)
Equity -0.033** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031***
(0.021) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.004)
Nonpublic -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
(0.104) (0.407) (0.409) (0.388) (0.404) (0.338)
Toehold 0.029 0.038* 0.038* 0.038* 0.037* 0.031
(0.203) (0.083) (0.081) (0.088) (0.087) (0.323)
Hostile -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022
(0.351) (0.138) (0.154) (0.150) (0.133) (0.563)
Tender -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014
(0.341) (0.225) (0.225) (0.205) (0.213) (0.285)
Related industry -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.684) (0.367) (0.362) (0.322) (0.310) (0.188)
Relative size 0.042* 0.042* 0.041* 0.041* 0.027
(0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.114)
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.309) (0.296) (0.351) (0.256) (0.617)
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.689) (0.701) (0.692) (0.782) (0.348)
Leverage -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009
(0.698) (0.677) (0.651) (0.657) (0.542)
Cash/assets -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016
(0.433) (0.455) (0.516) (0.493) (0.397)
Governance -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.596) (0.604) (0.707) (0.657) (0.505)
Runup -0.017* -0.018* -0.018* -0.018* -0.018**
(0.067) (0.065) (0.063) (0.060) (0.016)
Sigma -0.014 -0.008 0.051 0.031 0.128
(0.981) (0.990) (0.930) (0.958) (0.758)
Foreign debt 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.694) (0.681) (0.733) (0.672)
Intercept -0.007 0.013 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.028 0.015
(0.543) (0.415) (0.375) (0.370) (0.471) (0.340) (0.625)
S&P index fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,274 1,274 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,075
Adj R-squared 0.044 0.056 0.055 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.072
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Table 4: Deal completion probabilities and financial hedging
This table presents the regression results of cross-border M&A deal completion probabilities on
financial hedging variables. Probit (columns 1–4) and logit (column 5) regressions are estimated
based on a sample of 1,369 completed and withdrawn deals that are carried out by S&P 1500 firms
between 2000 and 2014. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the
deal was completed and 0 otherwise. Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix
A. Year, Fama–French 10 industry, and S&P index fixed effects are controlled for all regressions.
P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5
Fcd -0.031
(0.804)
Fcd/Ird -0.053
(0.694)
Fcd target 0.292** 0.322** 0.652**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cash 0.149 0.283
(0.259) (0.282)
Equity 0.221 0.415
(0.423) (0.417)
Nonpublic 0.524*** 0.891**
(0.010) (0.019)
Toehold -0.001 -0.206
(0.999) (0.864)
Hostile -1.456** -3.052**
(0.024) (0.012)
Tender 1.112*** 2.464***
(0.003) (0.006)
Related industry -0.205 -0.393
(0.115) (0.137)
Relative size -0.718* -1.484**
(0.057) (0.030)
Size -0.044 -0.102
(0.546) (0.481)
Tobin’s Q -0.037 -0.068
(0.454) (0.490)
Leverage -0.122 -0.123
(0.756) (0.872)
Cash/assets 0.112 0.137
(0.832) (0.895)
Governance 0.132** 0.247**
(0.037) (0.048)
Runup 0.228 0.470
(0.249) (0.228)
Sigma -31.541*** -61.840***
(0.004) (0.004)
Foreign debt -0.304** -0.651**
(0.039) (0.024)
Intercept 1.548*** 1.563*** 1.413*** 2.099** 3.916**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.017)
S&P index fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,369 1,369 1,219 1,171 1,171
Pseudo R-squared 0.042 0.042 0.049 0.128 0.129
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Table 5: Deal completion time and acquirer financial hedging
This table presents the tobit regression results of deal completion time on acquirer financial hedging
variables. The sample includes 1,282 successful cross-border mergers and acquisitions carried out by
S&P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014. The dependent variable, Completion time, is the number
of days between the deal announcement date and the acquisition effective date. Detailed definitions
of all variables can be found in Appendix A. Year, Fama–French 10 industry, and S&P index fixed
effects are controlled for all regressions. P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4
Fcd 32.37***
(0.000)
Fcd target 28.70***
(0.000)
Fcd/Ird 22.84***
(0.007)
Hedging scope 20.28***
(0.000)
Cash 7.46 4.99 6.26 7.56
(0.288) (0.524) (0.373) (0.282)
Toehold 33.55 37.37 32.98 25.60
(0.520) (0.434) (0.532) (0.633)
Hostile 43.80 36.25 38.49 38.74
(0.294) (0.403) (0.408) (0.371)
Tender 47.25*** 45.41*** 47.08*** 46.59***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Related industry 16.56** 18.64** 15.08** 15.15**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.033) (0.032)
Relative size 109.33*** 106.07*** 105.32*** 108.63***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Runup 1.46 -0.33 0.59 0.29
(0.894) (0.978) (0.957) (0.979)
Sigma -1940.7*** -1588.8** -1944.0*** -1685.3***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004)
Foreign debt 20.63** 24.45** 20.97** 16.78*
(0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.058)
Intercept 19.97 14.44 19.44 17.61
(0.456) (0.608) (0.482) (0.520)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 708 630 708 708
Pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.018
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Table 6: Long-run performance and financial hedging
This table presents the regression results of acquirer long-run performance measures on financial
hedging variables. The OLS regressions with robust standard errors are based on a sample of 1,276
successful cross-border M&As made by S&P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014. In columns 1–3
the dependent variable is the acquirer operating performance proxy variable 4AROA. In columns
4–6, the dependent variable is the acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal stock return (BHAR) over three
years after the announcement date. Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix
A. Year, Fama–French 10 industry, and S&P index fixed effects are controlled for all regressions.
P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Operating Performance Stock Performance
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fcd 0.007* 0.004**
(0.086) (0.041)
Fcd/Ird 0.007* 0.007***
(0.094) (0.001)
Hedging scope 0.001* 0.003**
(0.089) (0.013)
Cash 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.691) (0.672) (0.651) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049)
Equity -0.022* -0.022* -0.021* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007*
(0.088) (0.086) (0.097) (0.069) (0.086) (0.072)
Nonpublic 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.092) (0.091) (0.096) (0.174) (0.129) (0.171)
Toehold 0.020 0.020 0.020 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.119) (0.112) (0.118) (0.784) (0.724) (0.719)
Hostile 0.009 0.010 0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.753) (0.747) (0.732) (0.582) (0.571) (0.562)
Tender 0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.359) (0.341) (0.353) (0.540) (0.450) (0.500)
Related industry 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.315) (0.292) (0.293) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022)
Relative size -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.239) (0.263) (0.244) (0.418) (0.357) (0.392)
Size 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.019) (0.022) (0.032) (0.420) (0.369) (0.232)
Tobin’s Q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.765) (0.708) (0.542)
Leverage 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.436) (0.459) (0.516) (0.451) (0.561) (0.555)
Cash/assets -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.600) (0.553) (0.574) (0.584) (0.719) (0.679)
Governance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.910) (0.996) (0.965) (0.677) (0.548) (0.607)
Foreign debt -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.320) (0.323) (0.338) (0.199) (0.212) (0.266)
ROA -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.207*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.973) (0.967) (0.964)
Intercept -0.085*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.814) (0.922) (0.693)
S&P index fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 913 913 913 997 997 997
Adj R-squared 0.129 0.129 0.127 0.056 0.064 0.058
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Table 7: Acquirer announcement returns and financial hedging: alternative explana-
tions
This table presents the binary-treatment model regression results of acquirer cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) on financial hedging variables, with control variables for alternative explanations.
We only report the results of the second-step outcome equations. The first-step treatment regression
results are similar to those reported in Table 3. The first-step treatment equation is estimated by a
probit regression, where the dependent variable is Fcd (columns 1–2) and Fcd/Ird (columns 3–4).
In columns 1 and 3, the instrument variable used in the treatment equation is Analyst number. In
columns 2 and 4, the instrument variable used in the treatment equation is Foreign sales/Sales. In
the outcome equations, the dependent variable is acquirer CARs estimated by the market model.
All the control variables that are not listed separately in the outcome equations are the same as
those in Table 3. Year, industry, and S&P index fixed effects are controlled for all regressions.
P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Panel A. Managerial ability. We control for managerial ability variable, Managerial score
(Demerjian et al., 2012), in the outcome equations. This index is obtained from Peter Demerjian’s
website, which is then matched to our cross-border M&A sample over the period 2000 to 2011.
1 2 3 4
Fcd 0.137 *** 0.038 *
(0.004) (0.053)
Fcd/Ird 0.122 *** 0.074 ***
(0.000) (0.002)
Managerial score -0.042 ** -0.042 ** -0.047 ** -0.048 ***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
S&P/Industry/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 949 1,051 949 1,051
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B. Foreign operational exposures. We control for the number of mentions of target
nations in acquirers’ 10-K reports, Counts, in the outcome equations.
1 2 3 4
Fcd 0.106 ** 0.042 *
(0.014) (0.065)
Fcd/Ird 0.090 *** 0.066 **
(0.008) (0.014)
ln(Counts) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.826) (0.971) (0.890) (0.929)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
S&P/Industry/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,072 1,174 1,072 1,174
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Panel C. Serial acquirer. We control for serial acquirers in the outcome equations. The variable
Serial acquirer is equal to the number of deals carried out by the same acquirer before the deal
announcement in our sample.
1 2 3 4
Fcd 0.110 *** 0.034 *
(0.009) (0.062)
Fcd/Ird 0.105 *** 0.066 ***
(0.001) (0.003)
Serial acquirer -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.594) (0.919) (0.535) (0.787)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
S&P/Industry/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,081 1,184 1,081 1,184
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel D. Commodity. We control for commodity derivatives usage in the outcome equations.
The variable Commodity equals to 1 if an acquirer use commodity derivatives in the fiscal year
prior to the deal announcement, and 0 otherwise.
1 2 3 4
Fcd 0.102 ** 0.031 *
(0.015) (0.085)
Fcd/Ird 0.098 *** 0.061 ***
(0.003) (0.008)
Commodity -0.008 -0.011 * -0.006 -0.009
(0.267) (0.083) (0.366) (0.180)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
S&P/Industry/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,081 1,184 1,081 1,184
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel E. All four variables. We add all four control variables from Panel A to Panel D together
in the outcome equations.
1 2 3 4
Fcd 0.144 *** 0.045 *
(0.005) (0.078)
Fcd/Ird 0.125 *** 0.078 ***
(0.001) (0.010)
Managerial score -0.052 ** -0.055 *** -0.057 *** -0.061 ***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003)
ln(Counts) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.566) (0.883) (0.606) (0.934)
Serial acquirer -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.626) (0.905) (0.639) (0.863)
Commodity -0.004 -0.010 -0.001 -0.007
(0.675) (0.199) (0.920) (0.419)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
S&P/Industry/Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 718 795 718 795
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 8: Acquirer announcement returns and financial hedging: triple fixed effects
model
This table presents the regression results of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on
financial hedging variables with triple fixed effect estimation. The regressions are based on a
sample of 1,274 completed deals carried out by S&P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014. Following
Gormley and Matsa (2014), we use the triple interaction fixed effects model (Year × Acquirer
Fama-French 10 industry × Target Fama-French 10 industry) to control for unobserved acquirer
and target characteristics. The dependent variable is the acquirer CAR over the 11-day event
window (−5, +5) where 0 is the announcement day. The benchmark is estimated by the market
model with the CRSP value-weighted index over the pre-announcement window (−300,−91). The
control variables are the same as those in Table 2. Detailed definitions of all variables can be found
in Appendix A. P-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels
is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fcd 0.012** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.015) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044)
Fcd/Ird 0.011**
(0.043)
Hedging scope 0.005
(0.150)
Nv derivatives 0.015**
(0.039)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Triple fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,262 1,262 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,061
Adj R-squared 0.065 0.076 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.090
Table 9: Propensity score matched acquisition outcomes
This table reports the cross-border M&A deal outcomes adjusted using propensity scores that
are estimated by logit regressions of the FX hedging likelihood on firm characteristics. The sam-
ple includes 865 deals announced by FX derivatives users and 504 deals announced by non-FX
derivatives users. The independent variables in the logit regressions are Relative size, Leverage,
Cash/assets, Governance, and Tobin’s Q. The differences in deal outcomes between deals announced
by FX derivatives users (treated sample) and propensity score matched deals announced by non-FX
derivatives users (control sample) are reported. Detailed definitions of all variables can be found
in Appendix A. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗,
respectively.
10 Nearest 30 Nearest 50 Nearest Gaussian Kernel
CAR [−5, 5] 0.009 * 0.008 * 0.008 ** 0.010
(0.076) (0.078) (0.044) (0.150)
Completion 0.039 ** 0.042 ** 0.042 ** 0.052 *
(0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.063)
Completion time 11.4 12.0 * 7.9 20.1 ***
(0.133) (0.088) (0.408) (0.000)
4ROA t,t+3 0.008 ** 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 ***
(0.045) (0.001) (0.002) (0.065)
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Figure 1: Financial risks along a cross-border M&A timeline.
This figure presents a typical cross-border M&A timeline and the associated financial risks at
different phases of the deal. We define the pre-acquisition period to be between the deal initiation
date and the announcement date. During this period, acquirers and targets privately negotiate
with each other. Next we define the interim period to be between the announcement date and the
deal completion date. Finally, we define the post-acquisition period as the period after the deal
completion date, which can be further divided into the integration stage and the post-integration
stage.
• Pre-acquisition period: Evaluating target’s financial risk
• Interim Period: Transaction risk
– Transaction risk refers to the uncertainty that the U.S. dollar value of a target’s price
and the external financing costs may change with the foreign exchange rate and the
interest rate between the deal initiation and the deal completion.
• Post-acquisition period: Integration risk, Balance-sheet risk, Cash flow risk
– Integration risk refers to the uncertainty for an acquirer when designing the new financial
risk management programs of the combined entity during the integration period.
– Balance-sheet risk refers to the uncertainty about the U.S. dollar value of acquired assets
or liabilities, due to the movement of foreign exchange rates.
– Cash flow risk refers to the uncertainty about the U.S. dollar value of future operating
cash flows, due to the movement of foreign exchange rates.
Figure 2: Distribution of cross-border M&As by year.
This figure presents the annual numbers of cross-border M&As deals made by S&P 1500 companies
between 2000 and 2014. We also plot the annual numbers of cross-border M&As made by derivatives
users and nonusers using two solid lines. The two dotted lines represent the S&P 1500 index annual
returns (multiply by 100) and the annual trade-weighted U.S. dollar index levels.
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